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and ambushes. At one point, the convoy was only six
blocks along main roads from one of the downed heli-
copters, but the misdirection sent the convoy through
fifty-five blocks of back roads in the city, with time
wasting away for the downed helicopter crew. The con-
voy was under steady fire from roof tops and side
streets during this time. Eventually, the rescue force
was so depleted through injuries that their mission was
called off.
Fast forward to 2001, and the War in Afghanistan:
America’s military preparations show that we learned
sufficiently well to avoid the mistakes of Mogadishu.
First, the United States and its allies fought the Taliban
while using a concept called “steering, not rowing.” The
broad idea is that government workers need not, and
maybe should not, be the ones to carry out governmen-
tal goals. We see this increasingly in the delivery of
domestic governmental services, such as in the use of
non-profit agencies to deliver state-ordered welfare pro-
grams. In the context of war in Afghanistan, the
Rangers and Special Forces have had a much reduced,
but more focused and productive role. One of the core
competencies of the Special Forces is to train indigenous
military forces in weapons use, tactics, and in the moral
and ethical use of both while in the war zone.
Instead of engaging in battle (“rowing”), Special Forces
soldiers trained Northern Alliance units (“steering”) in
what were clearly quite productive techniques to win
the early phase of the war.
Why was this a superior strategy in 2001? After the
September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden called upon
Arab nations to join together in fighting against
America—much the same way that Aidid had called
upon Somalis to ignore his own atrocities, and focus on
outside threats from America. If the war in Afghanistan
had been fought predominantly with American sol-
diers, Al-Qaeda would have had a powerful recruiting
tool, to create local opposition to the anti-terrorist
effort. Clearly, this strategy allowed the war to proceed
more smoothly from the outset; the potential for oppo-
sition to coalesce against an “outside threat” was
reduced, since the Taliban were engaged in a battle pre-
dominantly against other Afghanis from the Northern
Alliance. 
This is certainly not the whole story. The fight against
the Taliban continues. The stability of the new govern-
ment under President Hamid Karzai is tenuous, and
there are still varied criticisms about the moral and ethi-
cal ways of the new government. But the main message
remains:  The United States made a better start in this
fight as a result of difficult lessons learned in Somalia.
Why couldn’t these superior American troops prevail
against a band of apparently disorganized Somali
youths?  Bowden builds a case that it was the very elite
nature of the American presence that inspired a highly
emotional hatred of the invading forces. The American
troops were unaware of the negative symbolism that
they portrayed. When Kevlar-clad warriors swooped
overhead in well-armed helicopters, Aidid’s soldiers
could criticize them as the real aggressors. Bowden tells
of how the helicopters would kick up frustrating dust
storms throughout the sandy streets of Mogadishu, and
even pull the corrugated metal roofs off of slum
dwellings with the backdraft of their propellers. Aidid’s
forces may have been autocratic and violent toward
Mogadishu’s citizens, but the warlord’s troops could
claim that at least they weren’t imperialist invaders
bent on destroying neighborhoods and homes. Once the
battle began, the hatred for Americans proved to be a
significant rallying device for Aidid’s lieutenants.
American soldiers found themselves in a fight not
against a handful of well-armed Aidid regulars, but
instead greatly outnumbered by a vast mob of street
fighters of varying capability.
The book and movie describe one other tragic compo-
nent of the Battle of Mogadishu, involving battlefield
coordination. American troops on the ground operated
with “eyes in the sky” officers in a helicopter and even
higher, in a Navy spy plane. The idea is that the spy
plane can see the entire battlefield, the road grid, and
opposing forces spread throughout the streets. When
the first of two Black Hawk helicopters was shot down
in the middle of the city, Rangers on the ground quickly
organized a rescue party. Mogadishu’s streets are
unpaved, narrow, and have no signage and few recog-
nizable landmarks. In theory, the Navy plane should be
able to direct the rescue unit’s Humvees across the city
to the downed helicopter, even in a manner that avoids
certain neighborhoods where Aidid’s forces may have
blocked streets to create ambush situations.
In practice, this coordinating system failed tragically.
The core of the problem was that the spy plane’s direc-
tions were relayed to the Humvees on the ground
through the intervening command helicopter. This cre-
ated a time delay, which confounded instructions to the
lead vehicle on the ground. In the spy plane, the naviga-
tor saw that the rescue convoy should take a left turn at
the third intersection. He passed this direction on to the
helicopter, but by then the lead Humvee had driven
past the first intersection. As a result the convoy of
Humvees took several wrong turns, into blind alleys
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BLACK HAWK DOWN,
AND LESSONS LEARNED IN WAR
The movie Black Hawk Down, based on the book by
journalist Mark Bowden, displays in heartbreaking
fashion some of the worst of American diplomacy, mili-
tary decision-making, and tactical choices in modern
times. In October 1993, the United States was involved
in a conflict with Mohammed Farrah Aidid, a Somali
warlord who controlled a portion of his country with a
brutal hand. The Battle of Mogadishu was intended as a
rapid insertion of Airborne Rangers and Special Forces
troops to kidnap two of Aidid’s lieutenants. Soldiers
would be dropped in from helicopters, take their prison-
ers, and be removed from the hostile city center by a
Ranger ground unit in trucks and Humvees. But the
American forces were taken off guard by the hatred and
fervor of the locals. The American troops thought their
enemy was a narrow group of Aidid’s close supporters,
where in fact, many citizens of Mogadishu joined in the
fight against the Rangers. Two Black Hawk helicopters
were shot down with surface-to-air missiles, and the
raid on Aidid’s leadership team turned into a recovery
effort of Ranger units and helicopter crews, stranded in
the narrow streets of the ancient city.
The movie focuses on the struggle of these elite Ameri-
can military forces to survive in the streets. In the end,
over one hundred American troops were wounded, and
nineteen died, while over a thousand Somalis lost their
lives. Bowden’s book covers the environment of this
conflict in rich detail, and describes some of the reasons
for this catastrophe. This battle was fought with the
wrong forces for the task;  with a misunderstanding of
how they were perceived in the community where they
fought;  and with problematic coordination and techni-
cal support.
The American forces in the Battle of Mogadishu includ-
ed two of the best tools in our arsenal. The core of the
strike force was a unit of Airborne Rangers, an elite,
select group of soldiers who are well-trained and well-
equipped for rapid strikes. In Mogadishu, the Rangers
operated from helicopters based at the city’s airport,
with the ability to move quickly to all points in the city
where they were needed. The American effort also
included a handful of Special Forces troops. These are
the most elite of all American soldiers. 
“This is an administration that will not talk 
about how we gather intelligence, how we 
know what we’re going to do, nor what our 
plans are. When we move, we will communi-
cate with you in an appropriate manner.”
“Americans should not expect one battle, but 
a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have 
ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, 
visible on TV, and covert operations, secret 
even in success.”
—President Bush at the outset of the war
Like most Americans under forty, I have little experi-
ence with America at war. Short engagements like
“Desert Storm,” Grenada, and Panama hardly qualify;
they were over almost as soon as they began. Now,
we’re faced with the real thing, the war on terrorism.
But as President Bush warned us, this is a war fraught
with confusion. What are we to make of this war, when
even the successes are secret and the failures are rich
fodder for a media starved for some form of coverage?
How do we balance hidden positive outcomes with
media overkill pertaining to governmental mistakes?
First, it is important to remember that there have been
some clear successes, at the outset in Afghanistan and
on the domestic front (probable terrorists captured in
Buffalo and Portland, Oregon for example). Second, it is
useful to consider success not only from specific threats
or incidents averted, or in contrast, to judge the fight
on terrorism as a failure when the terrorists pull off spe-
cific attacks. Our approach to considering this war
needs to involve a longer view, a pattern of effort over
the years. As citizens outside of the military or public
safety realm, we need to assess whether our govern-
mental leaders appear to be learning over time about
better ways to handle the threat of terrorism. There are
some encouraging signs, based on recent history, that
the government is retooling its organizational capacity
in responsive and effective ways to deal with the terror-
ism threat. This essay discusses two recent failed mili-
tary and public safety efforts, which have been
followed with encouraging reorganizations and reforms
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But on the other hand, a case can be made that consoli-
dation of many units has a better chance for success.
First, the current domestic security structure is convo-
luted, and appears to be impossible to manage. The
Homeland Security Department established an array of
agencies with a role in the domestic war on terrorism.
The organization chart shows twenty-two 
cabinet or department level organizations, and 119
functional agencies as playing a part in this fight. This
chart despite its expansiveness ignores two other com-
plex circumstances: Each cabinet-level agency is aligned
with at least one Congressional committee to help in
setting policy; and many of the 119 functional areas are
further supported by state and local units and agencies.
In many instances, it is not the entire agency (such as
the Department of Interior) which would fight terror-
ism, but a much smaller police unit within. This deep-
ening of the organization complexity raises numerous
questions and political problems. Would the Interior
Secretary, for example, easily concede to a Department
of Homeland Security request to free up these police
forces to fight terrorism, as opposed to some other part
of Interior’s mission?
Second, the coordination of many agencies has already
been tried, and has met with more failure than success.
The best comparable example of matrix management at
the Federal level has been in the war on drugs, where
the White House Office of Drug Control Policy operates
under a “czar,” a coordinator of far-flung agencies with a
stake in controlling the importation and use of illegal
drugs. We can look to some of what occurred in the
movie Traffic to see the failure of a “czar” to coordinate a
widespread effort with multiple and competing policy
goals. Traffic is the story of the war on drugs;  similar to
Black Hawk Down, it is based on documentary evidence,
but with a few more liberties to make the story interest-
ing. Traffic is a rich, textured movie, with an ironic plot
line about a committed drug “czar” with a horribly
crack-addicted daughter, and a compelling contrast
between “street-level’ drug enforcement officers in San
Diego and Mexico. 
The drug “czar” and the Secretary of Homeland
Security sound like powerful positions, but their actions
are constrained by the complexity of the issue and the
variety of the participants in the policy area. Chances
are, the office holder won’t outlast the problems. In
reality, Governor Ridge shares his authority, especially
with the Attorney General. The coordinating function
can be overstated, whenever separate agencies, with dif-
ferent missions and legislative sponsors, disagree.
In the movie, Judge Calloway “manages by walking
around” traveling to the agencies and places that matter
in his job as the “czar.” He only hears of the difficulties,
no successes, in the War on Drugs. A supervisor at a bor-
See Table 1 for a full summary of the organizational
improvements made between the engagements in
Somalia and Afghanistan.
TRAFFIC AND DOMESTIC LESSONS LEARNED 
During the summer of 2002, we were shown the plans
for “the most extensive reorganization of the federal
government since the 1940s.” President Bush announc-
ed a huge realignment of most of our domestic security
apparatus, involving approximately 170,000 Federal
government employees from agencies as diverse as the
Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, and the National Institutes of Health.
This mammoth bureaucracy would be called the
Department of Homeland Security. Indeed, no govern-
ment program so large had been intended for imple-
mentation on such a tight time frame since World 
War II.
Up to this point, coordination of domestic effort in the
war on terrorism had been in the hands of the White
House Office of Homeland Security. Its director, Tom
Ridge, had resigned as Governor of Pennsylvania in the
days after the September 11 attacks, and had worked in
conjunction with Attorney General John Ashcroft to
plan and set policy for the fight against terrorists. Ridge
is the identified leader of these efforts, and was thus
called the homeland security “czar.” The Department of
Homeland Security proposal was initially well received
by both Republicans and Democrats in Congress, but
met with delays and opposition to its specifics. The key
question in Congress surrounding the Department of
Homeland Security: Is it better to have a coordinator of
the anti-terror effort in many agencies, or a monolithic
department, including almost ten percent of the Federal
workforce within its boundaries? Eventually Congress
and the President reached a series of compromises and
passed legislation establishing the Department of
Homeland Security.  
Modern organization theory tends to point us toward
solutions that are more flexible and responsive to
changing demands in the operating environment. A
common form is the “matrix,” which involves the
establishment of leadership and planning networks
both by functional area (such as public health threats)
as well as by site (such as in the New England region).
When a specific functional area rises in importance,
that network becomes the focus of overall effort.
Advocates of matrix management contend that the old
hierarchy is outdated and hard to reorient in a crisis.
They can point to the greater responsiveness of a more
fluid, pragmatic military strategy in Afghanistan as part
of their supporting evidence.
der checkpoint in San Diego says
that he’d like to be able to attest
that they’re catching forty or fifty
percent of the drugs that “mules”
try to smuggle into California, but
in reality, he estimates that seven-
ty percent of the drugs get
through. While on an airplane
back from San Diego, with repre-
sentatives from the FBI, DEA, and
other agencies, Calloway tries to
initiate a brainstorming session—
but nobody has any new ideas.
Even worse, each agency leader is
afraid to reveal any ideas in front
of the other agencies that com-
pete for limited budgetary
resources.
The War on Terrorism is different.
It is encouraging that in organiz-
ing for this war, we likely won’t
make the same mistake of having
a White House “Coordinator” in
charge of the effort. Here’s one
argument in support of the con-
solidation of all, or at best most,
resources to fight terrorism.
Organization of the Department of Homeland Security
Secretary*
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with use of a few paid 
local informants
“Rowing”
The U.S. seen as intruder 
and aggressor
Lacking; U.S. Rangers and 
Special Forces were rivals, 
competing rather than 
cooperating toward goals
Leadership uses traditional 
top-down, command and 
control, from the air and 
remote posts; “Eyes in 
the Sky” orders 
confounded as they 
reach soldiers
Afghanistan
Some U.S. Special Forces, 
mostly in a training and support 
capacity, with local Afghani 
militias most prominent 
(e.g., Northern Alliance)
U.S assistance, support, and 
coordination of sympathetic 
local Afghani militias
“Steering”
The U.S. seen as supportive
of local autonomy
Enhanced, as the merits 
of conventional and non-
conventional forces are 
recognized
Leadership allows a more fluid, 
pragmatic, and empowered 
responsiveness at the centers 
of action; relays of information 
are also reduced, through the 
use of enhanced technology
Table 1
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and aggressor
Lacking; U.S. Rangers and 
Special Forces were rivals, 
competing rather than 
cooperating toward goals
Leadership uses traditional 
top-down, command and 
control, from the air and 
remote posts; “Eyes in 
the Sky” orders 
confounded as they 
reach soldiers
Afghanistan
Some U.S. Special Forces, 
mostly in a training and support 
capacity, with local Afghani 
militias most prominent 
(e.g., Northern Alliance)
U.S assistance, support, and 
coordination of sympathetic 
local Afghani militias
“Steering”
The U.S. seen as supportive
of local autonomy
Enhanced, as the merits 
of conventional and non-
conventional forces are 
recognized
Leadership allows a more fluid, 
pragmatic, and empowered 
responsiveness at the centers 
of action; relays of information 
are also reduced, through the 
use of enhanced technology
Table 1
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE BATTLE OF
MOGADISHU AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

























































points out the diffi-
culty of specifying
our goals in this war.
He asks, Is fighting
terrorism to be con-
sidered in the same
vein as conventional
war? Not exactly;






crime? Again, this is
not a good match;
there is much more to





ahead may be closest to disaster response and recovery;
that was the most important part of reestablishing
New York after the World Trade Center attacks, but we
wouldn’t want to stop there. The fact is, the war
against terrorism falls into all three policy areas. But all
three focuses have distinct political and bureaucratic
cultures. The intent of the Department of Homeland
Security is to give a high degree of command and con-
trol when the policy focus needs to change, from crime
prevention to disaster recovery to emergency prepared-
ness. This wouldn’t be possible under a system where
all of the terror-fighting agencies were able to retain
their own identity. See Table 2 for a summary of the
contrasts between the “czar” approach used in the War
on Drugs and the consolidated approach toward domes-
tic organization in the war against terrorism.
CONCLUSION: HAVE A LITTLE FAITH?
“At the end of the day, do [federal workers] 
serve the broader interest of homeland 
security where they are? Or is it conceivable 
that they should be cross-trained, or should 
they be moved into a different role? Who 
knows? We just don’t know.”
—Tom Ridge, 10 July 2002
Is Tom Ridge’s comment reassuring, or discouraging?
Some may be frightened that even he doesn’t know the
answers. I see it differently:  Ridge cannot predict the
future, and we should respect his honesty in this regard.
Further, we should be pleased that the government is
trying different options, even ones that buck current
trends and philosophy on organizational improvement.
This essay does not predict success or failure in the 
war on terrorism, but it does point toward the strong
potential that our governmental leadership and organi-
zations are learning from the recent past. The fighting
in Afghanistan was dramatically different from the suc-
cessful war effort in “Desert Storm” back in 1991, or the
failed one in Mogadishu in 1993;  we need to give credit
to our leaders that they got it right, at least late in 2001,
even if there are future unforeseen problems in Afghani-
stan in months or years to come. If the reorganization
underlying the Department of Homeland Security
winds up a failure, at least it won’t be a repetition of 
the most comparable recent failure, in the manner of
our organization to fight the War on Drugs. That is the
main lesson:  We can’t predict the future, but we can
and truly are learning from the past.
—Brendan Burke is Assistant Professor of Political Science 
If a modern Rip Van Winkle, a person who last visited a
library 20 years ago, should suddenly awaken, he or she
would be in for a shock. Gone are the bulky wooden
structures containing hundreds of drawers, the cata-
logues which once held a separate card for each book in
the library’s collection. Instead, entering the library,
Rip would see banks of computers, providing access to a
vast quantity of information from books, journals, and
newspapers as well as from libraries, websites and data-
bases around the world. Today, information can be
retrieved far more quickly and efficiently than ever
before. Yet this marvelous  technology has brought
with it new problems and challenges for students and
teachers.
As academic librarians, my colleagues and I at the
Maxwell Library are continually at work developing
new instructional strategies to meet the needs of
Bridgewater students and faculty. The internet has
transformed the way research is conducted and made
finding information a great deal easier. But it has creat-
ed challenges too. The sheer quantity of information
available can be bewildering. It’s common for a student
researcher to enter her topic in a search engine only to
discover, a few seconds later, several thousand ‘hits’ or
matches. How can she  limit this topic to make it more
manageable? 
Even more critical is the need to evaluate and analyze
information. Decades ago, when the only materials
available were those in the library’s own collection, stu-
dents could generally assume that the books and arti-
cles they found could be trusted. In the new world of
electronic information, however, students need to
become aware of the difference between materials
available through databases that the library subscribes
to and those accessed through search engines on the
internet. Databases provide material that may or may
not have been published in print form and is generally
from valid sources. Often references found on databases
have been peer reviewed and may even be available in
full text. Students using search engines, such as Yahoo,
will find a vast amount of material, but nothing has
been pre-selected and all sources appear equally valid.
Nothing on the screen tells the user whether or not the
information he is reading is accurate, whether the
author is reliable or prejudiced, a recognized authority
on his subject or a 7th grader. Library users must be
aware of the significant differences between general
internet searches, which provide no easy way to distin-
guish between the trivial and the significant, and the
databases, which facilitate academic pursuits. 
Programs promoting information literacy grew out of
the need to teach students to use electronic sources
effectively, and to evaluate, synthesize, and cite sources
correctly. To achieve this goal, Bridgewater’s academic
librarians have adopted several strategies. Introduction to
Information Resources, a required course which intro-
duces students to the resources and services available at
the Maxwell Library, has an internet component focus-
ing on search engines, web sites, etc. When customized
instruction is requested, librarians work closely with
individual faculty members to design sessions to meet
the needs of students in a particular course. The num-
ber of information literacy sessions offered at the
Maxwell Library has increased steadily over the past
few years: during the academic year 2000-2001, 5602
students participated in 246 bibliographic sessions. In
addition, the library offers a number of forums to intro-
duce faculty to the ever-changing world of information.
We encourage collaboration between faculty and
instructional librarians in an effort to improve the
methods for teaching students how to be better
researchers. 
Librarians are playing an active role in developing
strategies to promote information literacy. We want to
provide the resources and services necessary to have
BSC students graduate with a solid understanding of
the new information technology.
—Ratna Chandrasekhar began working at
the Maxwell Library in 1980 and was a Senior Librarian 
at the time of her death in October, 2002. She served as
Acting Director of the Library from 1991 to 1994. 
Ratna understood the enormous potential of computer 
technology and was instrumental in creating a classroom
within the library dedicated to teaching the basics of 
computer-based research. Well known in the campus 
community for her dedication to students and faculty, 
Ratna was a beloved and valued member of the library staff. 























Wide; many agencies have a
stake in this fight
Limited; agencies remain in-
dependent but are organized as
members of a “team”
Matrix, with the ability to 
treat regional problems or func-
tional problems, under 
the guidance of a “czar”
Maintained relatively intact;
only in certain situations and
under specific circumstances
does an agency’s broad 
mission need to focus on 
the shared problem
The matrix is well equipped 
to respond to a changing exter-
nal environment, in 
theory, as long as the “czar”
has real coordinating power
Domestic War on Terrorism
Wider; terrorism is an even more
varied and widespread threat than
drug violence, sales and use
Strong, at least in theory; all 
agencies and programs serve 
the same chief
Hierarchy, with all resources and
agencies operating under the orders
of the Secretary of Homeland
Defense
Significantly reduced; the mission of
agencies and programs within the
Department is made more narrow
and focused
The hierarchical agency should 
be able to reduce internal dissent
among separate agencies and
programs, as long as the resources
are not too diverse 
and diffuse
Table 2
CONTRASTS IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN THE WAR ON
DRUGS AND PROPOSED FOR THE DOMESTIC WAR ON TERRORISM
